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1 SUMMARY: Whether the Communications Act of 1934 allows the FCC 
the discretion to decline to review entertainment program format changes 
when a radio broadcast license is renewed or transferred. 
2. FACTS: Under the Communications Act of 1934, 47 u.s.c. § 310(d), 
no radio station license may be transferred or assigned "except upon 
application to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission that the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby." For 
the past 40 years, the Commission has consistently followed a practice of 
refusing to consider proposed program format changes in determining -------whether the license transfer or renewal is in the "public interest". 
J 
("Format changes•• refers to changes from one type of musical programming 
to another, i.e. classical to country & western.) The Commission had 
consistently taken the position that such an inquiry was not intended by 
Congress since it could potentially interfere with the First Amendment ~ 
rights of broadcasters and since the free market could effectively serve 
the programing interests of the public. 
In a series of decisions, the DC CA has adopted a contrary 
interpretation of the statute. In 1972, a Chicago radio station with a 
-------------------------~ classical music format entered into an agreement to sell the station to 
another owner who proposed to change the musical format to rock. A group 
of Chicago citizens petitioned the FCC, claiming that approval of the 
( license transfer would result in the loss of any classical music station 
\. 




the assignment of the license. The DC CA in Cit1zens Committee to Save 
WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (DC Cir~(en bane)) held that when the 
Commission considers an application to renew or transfer the license of a 
\ 
radio station with a "unique", financially viable entertainment format~ 
I the Commission must consider whether granting the application will ~ involve a change in that format. If such a change in programming f~ 
is involved, the Commission must determine whether the change would be in 
the public interest before acting on the application, including hearing s 
on the question if necessary. 
The court's statutory analysis was limited. The court found that 
under § 303(g) of the Act, "the 'public interest' to be served under the 
Communications Act is • the interest of the listening public in 'the 
larger and more effective use of radio'." The court relied on this 
Court's statement in~ational Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 
( 190, 216-17 (1943) that "the avowed aim of the Communications Act of 1934 
was to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the 
l A.&-'-. 
United States." The court concluded that "a policy of free competition'' 
in the programming format could not effectively serve the aim of 
~----------------~-~-----------------------
"securing the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United 
States." This conclusion was premised on theCA's observation that , t~e 
nature of the radio entertainment market was dependent upon advertising 
~e~enues. As a result, broadcaste rs find it in their interest to appeal 
~o particular audiences which will maximize advertising revenues. The 
~ e~~t would be radio programs in line with the tastes of young 
~-with larger discretionary incomes, to the detriment of the 
preferences of older audiences with less discretionary income. The court 
therefore remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 





-4- C'llb~~ ~~ 
WEFM. Instead, the FCC isues a Notice of Inquiry instituting~~~ ---administrative proceedings with public comment on the app~~ness and 
feasability of the Commission's selection of 
entertainment programming. The ~on also sought comments on the 
First Amendment implicatio Following notice and 
The Statement 
concluded t at format regulation of the k1nd required by the Court of 
App::ls'--W~1 decisio~as . inconsistent with the competitive policies 
adopted by Congress~rJS~nted intractable problems of administration, 
a unlikely to provide any significant increase in program diversity 
over that provided by market forces. 60 FCC 2d at 858. In reaching this 
/ 
conclusion, the Commission relied on this Court's decision in FCC v. 
Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 u.s. 470, 474-75 (1940), which 
emphasized that: 
"Broadcasters are not common carriers and are not 
to be dealt with as such. Thus the 
Communications Act field of 
broadcasting is . • • • 
Congress intende ~ m in the 
business of broadcasting where it found it, to 
permit a licensee who was not interfering 
electrially with other broadcasters to survive or 
succumb according to his ability to make his 
programs attractive to the public." 
The Commision added that if "broadcasters are to compete with one 
another, .•• they must necessarily do so in the domain of program 
formats, because there is virtually no other form that competition among 
broadcasters can take." The Statement noted that available data 
confirmed that competition provides a statutorily sufficient amount of 
diversity in radio entertainment programming. The practical difficulties 
which the Commission found would result included problems in determining 




(~ reasonable substitutes in the market, and if not, whether the benefits 
( 
accruing to the public from the format - change outweigh the public 
detriment which the format abandonment would entail. If both the old and 
new formats were unique, it would be faced with the problem of 
determining which format better served the public interest. The 
Commission expressed serious doubt about its capacity to determine the 
answers to these questions. Finally, the Statement expressed serious 
constitutional difficulties with the regulation of entertainment formats. 
Resps ?ought review of this statement of the FCC in the DC CA. In an 
en bane opinion, the CA reaffirmed its adherence to the "format doctrine" 
and invalidated the Policy Statement. The court, in an opinion by Judge ,---_____ 
McGowan, restated the basic premise of its previous holdings -- "that the 
Communications Act's 'public interest, convenience, and necessity' 
" 
Accordingly, the court concluded that Congress intended that "all major 
aspects of contemporary culture be accomodated by the 
commonly-owned public resources whenever that is technically and 
economically feasible." The court rejected the Commission's findings 
that the doctrine would not be administratively feasible. The court 
concluded that it would not be necessary to make a "public interest'' , 
determination on the basis of a format change in all cases. If the 
format was not financially viable, or if the devotees of the endangered 
format were too few to be served by the available frequencies, or there 
was no substantial support for the endangered format as evidenced by an 
outcry of public protest, a hearing would not be required. 
Judge Bazelon concurred in the court's decision to set aside the 
policy statement on procedural grounds. He concluded that the Commission 
had failed to make disclosure of a staff analysis paper prior to issuing 
. 
( 
the statement. This procedural error was found sufficient to necessitate 
new proceedings. He specifically noted his disapproval, however, of the 
majority's "unwillingness to give appropriate deference to the 
Commission's judgment" on the substantive questions before the court. He 
also stressed First Amendment implications. Judge Tamm filed a 
dissenting opinion in which Judge MacKinnon joined. The dissent 
concluded that the majority decision "usurps the proper role of the 
Commission in the formulation of communications policy." The opinion 
concluded that the Commission's determination that application of WEFM 
will not measurably increase diversity of entertainment formats is 





CONTENTIONS: The SG, as well as the numerous other private - · 
all make related arguments. The principal contentions essentially 
follows. (1) Insufficient deference to the agency. FCC v. ------------
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 u.s. 775 (1978) 
reaffirmed that the agency is vested with the primary "public interest" 
policy-making function. The CA is said to have improperly usurped the 
Commission's role in determining the "public interest". 
(2) Statutory interpretation. The petrs argue forcibly that the CA 
conducted only a superficial construction of the statute, and neglected 
to consider any legislative history. Several sections of the Act are 
cited to indicate that Congress did not intend for the Commission to 
undertake any review of programming format changes in granting transfers 
or renewals of licenses. First, under 47 u.s.c. § 153(h) Congress made 
explicit that broadcasters are not to be regulated as "common carriers." 
Under § 309(a) Congress provided that when the Commission acts on an 
(~ application for renewal or transfer, it "may not consider whether the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity might be served by the 
\ 
- 7 -
transfer, assignment, or disposal of the permit or license to a person 
other than the proposed transferee or assignee." This provision was said 
to be included so that the Commission could not grant or deny 
applications on the basis of the fact that other broadcasters might 
better serve the public interest. Finally, under § 326, Congress 
provided that: 
"Nothing in this Act shall be understood or 
construed to give the Commission the power of 
censorship over the radio communications or 
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no 
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or 
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere 
with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication." 
In addition to the statutory language, the petrs cite legislative history 
to support the conclusion that Congress never intended for the FCC to 
interfere with the programming decisions of regulated broadcasters. It 
is also noted that Congress has funded public broadcasting efforts to 
provide programming which might not otherwise be economically viable in 
the competitive market. These congressional efforts are said to satisfy 
the needs for diverse programming in the radio market. 
(3) First Amendment considerations. All petrs suggest that the 
ruling of the DC CA will lead to substantial First Amendment problems. 
The risk of losing a license or an opportunity to transfer a liense due 
to changes in program format might substantially "chill" a broadcaster's 
willingness to abandon present formats and deter experimentation in new 
formats. The Commission will be required, at least in some cases, to 
explicitly engage in content regulation of broadcasters. 
(4) Inconsistency with this Court's opinions. Petrs all cite a 
number of decisions of this Court said to be in tension with the holding 
of the CA. In NCCB v. Democratic National Committee, 412 u.s. 94 (1973) 
\ 
the DC CA overturned portions of the Commission's rulemaking on 
newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership, an area where Congress delegated 
"broad authority to the Commission to allocate broadcast licenses in the 
'public interest'." This Court held that Congress committed "the 
weighing of policies under the 'public interest' standard to the 
Commission, which was entitled to give greater force to best practicable 
service than to diversity of ownership. This Court reinstated the 
Commission's policy in its entirety. In that decision, the Court held 
that "Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with 
the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations." 
412 u.s. at 110. The decision in FCC v. Sanders Bros., relied on by the 
FCC, and quoted above, is also cited as contrary to the decision of the 
CA. 
Resps defend the decision of the CA as consistent with the statute in 
requiring the FCC to fully examine the "public interest." The resps also 
notes, however, that the proceedings of the FCC were deficient in that 
the Commission failed to release a staff study for public comment which 
later was included in the policy statement. This is the procedural 
deficiency which Judge Bazelon found sufficient to order further 
proceedings. 
' ~ 
4. DISCUSSION: Jurisdiction over FCC actions is limited to the D.C. 
Court of Appeals so a conflict on this question will never develop. The 
statutory arguments of the petrs are quite substantial. The only 
possible impediment to review on the merits is the alleged procedural 
deficiency which formed the basis for Judge Bazelon's concurring 
opinion. It seems clear, however, that the majority of the Court did not 
( rely on this deficiency, although they did characterize it as error. 




alleged procedural error if the statute and its history make clear that 
the Commission must not engage in program format review. Furthermore, 
even if the Commission's factual findings are necessary to support its 
position on this issue, and the procedures were deficient, it might be 
better to remand for further proceedings than to let the judgment of the 
CA vacating the statement outright stand without review. I would 
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The SG, on behalf of all petrs, has filed a response to 
resps' motion to dispense with 
costs to designating party. 
printing the appendix or assign 
~ 
$ ~_g; w::J: ~ 
r. )J puvilt4' ;1 I 
--r ~rk r!_ 
/IA·l1 -jA T- ws. 
- 2 -
The SG believes that a short printed appendix will assist 
the Court and is prepared to acquiesce in the motion to the 
extent that it prays for an order assigning all costs of print-
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Resps move to dispense with printing the appendix pursuant 
to Rule 36. The questions presented in this case are solely ques-
tions of law. The factual setting has been fully set out in the 
proceedings below and appear in the appendix to the cert petn. All 
necessary material is in the appendix to the cert petn, or the 
original record. The FCC has the full administrative record. 
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. d .;~~~ 
Quest1on Presente k ~
Does the Communications Act of 19 34 requires the FCC 
to review entertainment program format 
' 
broadcast license is renewed or transfered~~~-~~ ,~0 
r:c..c.~~~ .. --~, 
4 ~~~ C/-1-b~ -
"~M-L~ .•• J ,1 Back round 'rC'C Jo  ...._... 
This c~~~ ~~s~ ~o~challenges to 
CAD~£._{tt:r:~g ~n F<JC p;Ji gy sta~emen
r~~~~ LA- (.NV~ tA-L~ 
the C ADChave fought over the question for ten years. The basic 
problem for this Court is to allocate responsibility between 
the CADC and the FCC for interpreting and furthering the 
"public interest" standard of §§ 309(a) and 310(b) of the Act. 
./ 
While it is necessary to understand the interpretations that 
each entity has placed upon the Act, the question ultimately 
not which interpretation is correct, but who gets to decide. 
The line of cases involved here began with Citizens 
Committe (Atlanta) v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (1970), where the CADC 
set aside a radio station's license assignement because the 
assignee planned to change the station's format from 
"classical" to "popular" music. Despite a public outcry that 
Atlanta was to deprived of its only classical music station, 
the Commission approved the assignment, because of its view 
that choice of program formats was within the discretion of 
licensee. The CA held that the FCC must hold a hearing before 
approving the transfer. Section 310(b) of the Act provides that ~~ 
no license may be tranferred without a finding by the 
------~--------------------------------------------------
Commission that the assignement will serve the "public 
interest". Section 309(e) provides that a hearing must be held ----
before approval if "a substantial and material issue of fact is 
presented". Pointing to a survey that showed that 16% of the 
population preferred the classical to the new format, the CA 
reasoned that "it is surely in the public interest ... for all , 
major aspects of contemporary culture to be accomadated by the 
commonly-owned public resources [i.e., the radio spectrum] 
whenever that is technically and financially feasible." 436 
F. 2d at 269. In the case before it, the CA held that the FCC 
had to hold a hearing to determine if the old format was 
economically viable and if the Atlanta was served adequately by 
a nearby classical station. 
The Commission was plainly unhappy with its new 
responsibility, leading Judge Tarnrn to note that the Commission 
wished to narrow the precedent to "cases involving Atlanta 
classical music stations." Citizens Committee to Keep 
Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C.Cir. 1973). In that 
case the CA set aside a license assignment approved by the 
Commission which would have resulted in a change from an 
allegedy unique progressive rock format to middle of the road 
music. The fact that the assignee had promised to play some 
progressive rock selections was deemed immaterial since: "We 
deal here with format, not occassional duplications of 
selections." !d. at 932. The FCC's duty to resolve issues of 
disputed fact in a hearing was held to arise whenever there was 
significant "public grumbling" at the proposed format change. 
In Citizens Committe to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 
(D.C.Cir. 1974) (en bane), the court reaffirmed and clarified 
its format doctine, while setting aside another Commission 
approved assignement of a license, when the assignee intended 
to replace a classical music format with "contemproary" 
programming: 
' . 
When faced with a proposed format change, the 
FCC is obliged to determine whether the format 
to be lost is unique or otherwise serves a 
apecialized audience that would feel its loss. 
If the endangered format is of this variety, 
then the FCC must affirmatively consider whether 
the public interest would be served by approving 
the proposed assignment, which may, if there are 
substantial questions of fact or inadequate data 
in the application or other officially 
noticeable materials, necessitate conducting a 
public hearing in order to resolve the factual 
issues or assist the Commission in discerning 
the public interest. Finally, it is not 
sufficient justification for approving the 
application that the assignor has asserted 
financial losses in providing the special 
format; those losses must be attributable to the 
format itself .... " id. at 262. 
WEFM marked a heightening of the dispute between the 
FCC and the CADC. The en bane hearing had been prompted in part 
by a statment appended to the Commission's order, wherein six 
commissioners had expressed the view that the format doctrine 
and that the best balance between freedom and 
diversity could be acheived by leaving program choice to the 
;::cc$ 
free market. The CA specifically rejected eh-±s view. It wrote 
that there is not a perfect free market in radio entertainment. 
First, access to the specxtrum is limited by technology, 
existing government regulation, and economic factors. 
Broadcasters wish to satisfy advertisers rather than listeners; 
~, ~ ----------~------------------------------------
advertisers may prefer to reach a larger or demographically 
more desireable audience to maximise revenues, and in this 
quest ignore the legitimate demands of other listeners. The 
court acknowledged that it is not entrusted with making "radio 
policy," but thought its duty was to further the Congressional 
aim of securing the maximum benefits or radio for all 
- ,. 
the 
people. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 
190, 216-17 (1943). 
Judge Bazelon concurred in the result, but added an 
opinion dealing with the First Amendment implications of the 
court's rule. He noted that broadcasting is a difficult First 
Amendment area, where courts are forced to balance conflicting 
First Amendment values: the freedom of the broadcaster to 
present what he wishes and the need for diversity of voices on 
scarce radio bands. Without being satisfied by his reasoning, 
he concluded that the FCC should have no authority to consider 
program content, except in a comparitive hearing. His main 7 
concern was that when he FCC chooses among speakers, its choice 
can never be content neutral. 
The FCC ~ regrouped and attempted to lay a 
foundation for refuting the CA's format doctrine. It issued a 
Notice of ~Inquiry, - inviting interested parties to offer 
comments on the format doctrine, and the ways the FCC might 
administer it. The Notice is full of indications that the FCC 
thought the CA misguided. The Commission expressed its view 
that it could not through regulation acheive superior diversity 
in formats than the free market, and that the attem1 pt to do so 
would raise serious First Amendment difficulties by injecting 
the government into private programming choices. This theme was 
elaborated in separate statements by Chairmen Wiley and 
Commissioner Robinson. The latter wrote a powerful attack on 
~----... 
the format doctrine, which you might find useful to read (APP; , --at 82a). The separate statements emphasized the difficulties of 
effective regulation in this area: the Commission thought it 
difficult to define "format", differentiate among particular 
formats and conclude whether a particular format is unique. The 
application of the format doctrine to any particular case would 
be subjective and would embroil the government in scrutiny and 
disapproval of program content to an extent inconsistent with 
the First Amendment. It would also chill format innovation, 
because a broadcaster would fear legnthy, expensive hearings 
before being able to abandon the format. 
Having received evidence and comments the Commission 
issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order. Therein, the 
Commission continued its argument against the format doctrine. 
Reviewing its statutory mandate, the Commission emphasized that 
the Act did not impose common carrier obligations on 
--------- ------------------------------------------------broadcasters, 47 u.s.c. §3(h), but contemplates that the "field 
---------------of broadcasting is one of free competition." FCC v. Sanders 
Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940). Congress had 
intended broadcasters to serve the public interest through 
competition in entertainment, and that competition had created 
a "bewildering array of diversity" in major markets. Conceding 
that the market does not match perfectly listener preferences 
with programming, the Commission found no reason to believe 
that regulation would foster greater diversity. Herein, the 
Commission bewailed CADC decisions forcing it to distinguish 
formats: progressive rock from ther r f ock music, 19th Century 
<\ 
from 20th Century classical music. Moreover, in the 
Commission's view every format is in important respects unique: 
style, timing, selection of material, and personalaities all 
combined to give each station a particular "sound". The 
Commission supported this observation by citing a staff study 
which purported to demonstrate that audience shares for 
stations varied as much within as among format types. Finally, 
the Commission rei teratf ed its concern about harm to First 
Amendment values from government interference in entertainment 
broadcast decisions. In summary: 
Any such regulatory scheme would be flatly inconsistent 
with our understanding of congressional policy as 
manifested in the Communications Act, contraproductive 
in terms of maxim1s1ng the welfare of the radio-
listening public, administratively a fearful and 
comprehensive nightmare, and unconstitutional as 
impermissibly chilling innovation and experimentation in 
radio programming. 
The CA's rejection of the Memorandum Opinion and 
Order is what is now before this Court for consideration. CADC 
was far from pleased with the Commission's treatment of its 
------~-~-----
formast rule, finding that the administrative proceedings "cast 
serious doubt on the rationality and impartiality of its 
action." First, theCA criticized the Commission for relying on 
a study never disclosed prior to final decision. Second, the CA 
ridiculed the Commission's "administrative nightmare" argument, 
by pointing out that only one format dispute had actually 
blossomed into a protracted hearing. Third, CADC found the 
Notice of Inquiry so biased against the format doctrine that 
the subsequent proceedings must necessarily be slanted. 
Finally, CADC complained that the Commission had misconstrued 
the sweep of the format doctrine, terming it among otnet 
things, "a system of broadcast programming by government 
decree", and failed to attempt to implement the rule with 
appropriate administrative standards. 
~ The CA emphasized the narrowness of the format 
~ ----------------------------~ f\ "j:v doctrine. It does contemplate that most broadcasting will be 




that imperfections in the market call for some regulatory 
corrective to assure sufficient diversity on the radio. The 
obligation placed ont he Commission is narrow: 
[T]he Commission's obligation to consider format C~~~ ~ 
issues ~ arises only when there is strong vt..--
prima facie evidence ~hat the market has in fact 
broken down. No public interest i ssue is ra i sed 
if{T}tnere is an adequate substitute i~ the 
service area for the format being abanoned, 
(2)there is no substantial support for the 
endangered format as evidenced by an outcry of 
public protest, (3) the devotees of the 
endangered format are too few to be served by 
the available freque ¢ncies, or (4) the format is 
not financially viable .... The small remainder 
of cases are simply those in which the evidence 
strongly indicates that market mechanisms have 
not satisfied the Communications Act's mandate 
A.~ that radio serve the needs of all the people . 
. L,..~ CADC emphasized its duty to construe the "public 
C fir'Jl 0-nterest" standard of the Act. Its format doctrine was not 
~ /1 y ~' policy, but law. While the Commission's interpretation of its 
'- tf1 -organic act is entitled to deference, CBS, Inc. v. DNC, 412 
u.s. 94, 121-22 (1973), here the CA has consistently held that 
the Commission's decision not to hold a hearing when a unique 
format is to be eliminated cannot be sustained under the Act. 
The Commission's recent report was littlw more than a refusal 
to follow valid court interpretation of the law. As such the 
Order was void. 
Judge Bazelon concurred in the result because he 
thought that the Commission's reliance on the undisclosed study 
violated fundamental rulemaking principles, Portland Cement 
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F,2d 375, 393 (D.C.Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied 417 u.s. 921 (1974). He, however, plainly thought that 
,. 
the Commission's free market approach was more in accord with 
the First Amendment. Judge Tamm wrote a dissent, arguing that 
the CA had "usurped" the role of the FCC in setting 
communications policy. He thought the court was bound to uphold 
the Commission's policy as reasonable. 
In sum, the majority's opinion presents an unjustified 
rebuttal to the Commission's conclusion that the public 
interest may not be discerably ? furthered by the 
implementation of the WEFM doctrine. The majority has 
not explained how to decide whether a specific format is 
unique, how to measure the number of listeners who favor 
a changed format, or how to compare the intensity of 
preference between listeners who desire retention of a 
unique format and those who prefer a variation of a 
preexisting format. Finally, the majority has failed to 
identify the principle within the Communications Act 
that mandates regulation favoring the interests of fewer 
listeners over the interests of more listeners. 
Judge Tamm also thought that reliance on the undisclosed study 
was not dispositive and that the court had not given due 
/deference to the Commission's assessment of market forces; 
complete factual support in the record for the Commission's 
predictions or judgments in neither practical nor required. FCC 
v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 
814 (1978) . 
Contentions 
The above presents only in summary the terms and 
---------~------------
history of the debate about the wisdom of holding a hearing 
when a unique format is endangered. To give full vent and 
analysis to the parties' contentions about the merits of the 
policy would take pages and weeks. While standing prepared to 
delve further into this most interesting question, I think it 
preferrable to concentrate here on the contentions involving 
what I think the dispositive issue in the case: who gets to 
-----------------~---
decide whether the format doctrine should be implemented? The --real issue is whether the discretion to construe the 
"public interest" standard government 
.1\ 
when the loss of a unique format is threatened. 
action 
The various parties opposed to the CADC decision make 
similar arguments on this issue and will be referrred to 
collectively as petrs. Petrs' main argument is that nothing in 
the Act explicitly requires the FCC to preserve formats, and, 
absent such specific directive, the Commission's interpretation 
of how the public interest standard is best served must be 
upheld by a court unless it is unreasonable. 
1. Does the Communications Act require the FCC to 
intervene in the market to preserve unique formats? 
~ 
~ 
~) Petrs point out that the CADC pointed to no provision ~ 
of the Act to support directly its format rule. Rather, th~~ 
·~~ 
court relied on the public interest standard contained i
§310(d). As this Court has held, weighing of policies under the c19~ 
public interest standard is primarily entrusted to the , 
Commission. FCC v. National Citizen's Committee for 
Broadcasting, 436 u.s. 775, 810 (1978). CADC also drew support 
from § 303(g), which merely admonishes the Commission to 
"generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio 
in the public interest." Petrs contend that this horatory 
provision gives no support to format regulation specifically, 
and certainly does not limit the means available to the 
Commission to further the stated goal. See Nat'l Broadcasting 
Co. v. United States, 319 u.s. 190, 215-219 (1943). 
Petrs argue that, on the contrary, leaving choices of 
entertainment programming entirely to the discretion of 
licensee is consistent with the Act and its legislative 
history. Enforcement of the CA's format doctrine would impose 
common carrier obligations on broadcasters in violation of 
§3(h). See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). It 
would also conflict with §326 which forbids the FCC from 
censoring broadcasters or interfering with their right of free 
speech. At a minimum, the Commission could rely on these 
policies to refrain from interfering with choices of 
entertainement "to preserve editorial control of programming in 
the licensee." Id. at 705. See also CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 
105. 
Petrs claim that the legislative history evinces a 
Congressional intent to secure broadcasters the widest freedom 
in choosing programming consistent with the public interest. 
This intent is extracted from Congressional refusal to adopt 
"priorities" for programming, i.e. rules that broadcasters must 
play more "high class music" than jazz, or allocate so much 
time for religious or other preferred programming. 
~ r..J!:} For convenience, I will group as resps the various 
~~listener groups, musical organizations, and public interest 
~~ groups who support the CADC either as resps or amici. Resps 
Y make the same statutory argument as did CADC. Section 309 (a) -
requires the Commission to deterimine whether granting a 
license application would serve the public interest; §310 (d) 
provides the same rule for assignment of licenses. Section 
309 (d) (1) provides that an interested party may challenge the 
application as not being in the public interest. Listeners have 
standing to bring this claim. Office of Communications of the 
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.Cir.l966) {per 
Burger, J.). Section 309(d) (2) provides that if the challenges 
raise a "substantial and material issue of fact" as to whether 
the application is in the public interest, the Commission must 
hold a hearing. Diverse programming that will serve the 
preferences of all the people is in the public interest. When 
significant numbers of listeners complain to the FCC that 
assignment of the license will result in the loss of a unique, 
financially viable program format, they have raised a material 
issue of fact, and the Commission must hold a hearing. The 
provision for a hearing indicates that the Commission must 
consider the complaints of listeners and not allow license 
assignemnts to be governed only by market forces. 
The CA' s interpretation of §§309 and 310 does not 
conflict with other provisions of the Act. Preventing the loss 
of a unique format does not make the broadcaster a common 
carrier. This Court has found this provision violated only when 
rules have given the public a right of access to the airwaves. 
CBS V. DNC; FCC V. Midwest Video. Under the format doctrine no 
non-licensee would have access to the airwaves. Moreover, the 
doctrine does not involve impermissible censorship. The Court 
has long recognized that the FCC does not exceed its power when 
it concerns itself with the nature of the programming a 
broadcaster presents. Nat'l Broadcasting Co. v. u.s., supra. 
See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
Indeed, the Commission for years has been considering in 
comparative hearings the programming a broadcast applicant 
proposes to air. See generally Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 
326 U.S. 327 (1945). Finally, responding to valid listener 
complaints about loss of a unique format does not involve the 
Commission in enforcing government preferences about what 
programming is best for the public. 
2. Who decides whether government action to prevent 
the loss of a unique, financially viable radio format is in the 
It b ' ' '\ pu l1c Interest? 
[tt-) ~s contend that the FCC and not the courts decide 
~ ~hich regulatory efforts are in the public interest. This Court 
f,e-1-1"" ~~ held that Congress has delegated the weighing of policies 
r?t, ~~under the public interest standard to the Commission. FCC v. 
~~Nat'! Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, supra, 436 412 U.S. 
~~ ..... at 810. That case involved CADC invalidation of FCC rules 
,. 1 
~ ~ exempting from a general ban on co-ownership of newspapers and 
~ , 
broadcast facilities most pre-existing combinations. This Court 
held that the CA hed erred in substituting its policy judgment 
for that of the responsible agency; even while pursing a clear 
policy goal, the Commission can balance competing interests to 
acheive practical benefits. Similar is CBS v. DNC, 412 u.s. 94 
(1973), where the CADC set aside the agency's determination 
that broadcasters need not sell time to parties wishing to 
r 
advocate controversial views on public issues. This Court 
reversed because it found nothing in the Act to compel a 
conclusion contrary to that of the Commission, and because the 
CA had failed to give "due weight" to the agency's judgment. 
Generally, the CA has violated the admmonishmeny in Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 u.s. 519, 558 (1978)' that administrative 
decisions should be set aside only for procedural or 
substantive reasons as mandated by statute. Here, as 
demonstrated above, nothing in the Act precludes the 
Commission's construction of the public interest. Judge Tamm 
was correct in dissent below that the CA has confined " the FCC 
to a spectator's role". 
{jrj Resps contend that the CADC has merely construed a 
statute, which on its face requires that the FCC hold a hearing 
when complainants raise a material issue of fact as to whether 
a license assignment is in the public interest. This Court has 
set aside FCC decisons because the Court believed that the 
decision did not comport with the statute. In FCC v. Midwest 
Video, 440 u.s. 689 (1979), the Court set aside regulations 
dealing with access to cabal television stations because it 
thought that the regulations imposed a common carrier's duty on 
the broadcaster in violation of the Act. Here, the CA merely 
held that the public interest hearing provision prohibited the 
Commission from relegating the decision as to whether the 
public iterest would be served by an assignment to the 
marketplace. The CA's decision went no further than the 
explication of the statute, as it evident from the vast 
discretion it left the Commission as to the definition of 
format and the standards of proof for demonstrating that a 
format is unique or financially sustainable. 
3. Was the FCC's decision not to regulate format loss 
arbitrary or capricious? Petrs argue tht the Commission's 
decision to leave format selection eni tirely to the market is 
reasonable and supported by the record. The Commission accepted 
the view that diversity of voices on the radio is desireable. 
It concluded that the free market had done a reasonably good 
job in creating and sustaining diversuty; in so cvoncluding it 
relied on the staff's study of format diversity in the 25 
largest markets. The Commission also made a reasoned judgment 
that government efforts were unlikly to contribute to diversity 
and would not be worth the costs. More specifically, the 
Commission described at some legnth the difficulty of 
classifying formats, each of which was if\ some sense unique. 
Moreover, the Commission has no way to measure the intensity of 
the viewers' preference for the format proposed to be 
abandoned; given this handicap, the Commission has no rational 
basis for determining in a particular case whether the public 
interest would be served by retention of a particular format. 
While regulation would be ineffiient, it would also pose First 
Amendment problems. The spector of expensive administrative 
hearings would chill broadcasters' willingness to experiment 
with new formats, the abandonment of which might lead to public 
grumbling. These conclusions by the Commission need not be be 
supported by overwhemling evidence, because a "forecast of the 
direction in which the future public interest lies necessarily 
involves deductions beased on the expert knowledge of the 
agency." FCC v. NCCB, supra, 436 U.S. at 814. 
Resps answer that the Commission was so biased against 
~C-- the format doctrine that its cons : deration w;;;;---:rbi: rary and 
~~ capricious. The Commisson relied in part on the argument that 
{" administering the format doctrine would be an "administrative 
~~nightmare." The Commission was fporced to retract this poi tion 
~v at oral argument before the CADC upon admitting that there had 
only been one hearing conducted since 1970, all other cases had 
been settled or the CADC had afirmed the Commission's 
conclusion that no hearing need be held. This disingenuous 
argument illustrates the Commission's bias against the format 
doctrine. This bias is demonstrated even more clearly in the 
Commission's persisi tent exaggeration and misstatement of the 
doctrine, claiming that it requires extensive and minute 
government regulation of entertainment broadcast content. Given 
this bias, the Commission failed to seriously consider ways of 
implementing the doctrine. Formats can be classified 
adequatelyand the CADC indicated that the Commission would have 
leaway in the classification. In short, the Commission did not 
give the format doctrine reasoned analysis, but prepared an 
advocate's brief against it. 
Both parties also argue about whether the Commission's 
failure to provide the staff study to the public for comment 
before decision is a procedural error requiring a remand. 
Resp's contend that the "comment" required by §553 of the 
A.P.A. includes an opportunity to rebut or challenge all 
relevent material prior to decision. See, e.g., United States 
v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 
1977) • Here, the staff study was "decisive" in t he agency's 
view. Petrs argue that the A.P.A. noiwhere mentions this 
principle, that resp's position would add procedural 
requirements in violation of Vermont Yankee, and that the CADC 
never found this to be a ground for reversal in this case. 
Discussion 
My organization of the parties' contentions reflects 
my view of this case. The central issue is whether the FCC or 
the CADC ~paramount authority to interpret the public 
interest standard of the Act. I conclude that unless a fairly 
specific provision of the Act or the First Amendment prohibit 
the Commission's policy choice, as was the case in Midwest 
Video, supra, then, assuming that the APA has been complied 
with, that choice is unreviewable. - ---- This assessment is 
unremarkable and seems compelled by general principles of 
administrative law and direct precedents, including CBS v. DNC, 
and FCC v. NCCB. 
CADC could point to no explicit provision in the Act 
requiring the Commission to preserve unique radio formats. Its 
reliance on §§ 309 and 310 is appealing, but unpersuasive. 
These provisions require no more than th~ the Commission must 
hold a hearing if a party raises a substantial, material issue 
of fact about whether granting the pending application is in 
the public interest. However, nothing there prevents the 
Commission from concluding that an application can never be 
against the public interest solely because its approval would 
result in the elimination of a valued format. To hold otherwise 
bootstraps a procedural requirement into a substantive command. 
The question of whether format regulation is in the public 
interest still res ides at the Commission. Likewise, § 303 (g) 's 
goal that the Commission acheive the larger and more effective 
use of radio says nothing about preserving formats. 
The parties argue at great legnth about the First 
..:;o 
Amendment, primarily questioning whether the format doctrine is 
or i~ot constitutional. The question obviously is ~~the 
refusal to implement the format doctrine is constitutional. It 
is a truism that First Amendment analysis of broadcasting does, 
as Judge Bazelon remarked, make skeptics of us all; it is a 
~ ~ 1 frustrating area were preservation of one First Amendment value 
~~ ( seems to require abandonmentemnt of another. Still, it is hard 
~~ to see how a government decision not to interfere with private 
vr::v--, decisions about the entertainment content of broadcasts can 
\ r violate the First Amendment. Even this issue is not presented 
~ here, as no ruling on the question was entered below. 
The Commission's decision to allow the market to 
allocate entertainment programming is reasonable. Formats are 
hard to classify and crude classifications might do more harm 
than good. The market, including non-profit stations, does 
provide considerable diversity in major cities and many rural 
areas. Moreover, the market is more resons i ve to changes in 
viewer tastes, which are dynamic, than is government 
regulation. There are, additionally, better regulatory 
mechanisms than format retention to further diversity which the 
Commission is persuing: greater diversity of ownership and more 
stations. That reasonable people can differ over the efficacy 
of various diversity enhancing regulations only further argues 
that deference should be paid to the Commission's choices. 
The Commission's hyperbolic characterizations of the 
format doctrine is disturbing. WEFM never contemplated the -
kinds of sweeping regulation that the Commission declaimed 
against. Still, the unusual posture of this case goes some way 
toward excusing the Commission's reaction. The agency clearly 
felt that a court was forcing an unwanted regulatory venture 
upon it. Given that the agency thought its view of broadcating 
policy was being disregarded, I cannot say that its 
consideration of the policy question was so arbitrary as to 
render the agency's final decision invalid under the APA. 
Beyond the immediate legal question presented, there~ 
is stong reason to decide for the Commission. Communications 
are going through a technological revolution: home video 
-----~----------------
; ,. 
equipment, satelite transmissions, two-way video 
communications, and expanded broadcast bands are either here or 
coming soon. The Commission should retain the flexibility to 
respond to these changes and not be committed to definitions of 
the public interest which can only be changed by Congressional 
enactment. Upholding the CADC here could stall for a long time 
the Commission's major efforts to further deregulate both radio 
and television. Such efforts may or may not be wise, but the 
issue should be resolved in political fora like the Commission, 
not in court. 
The remaining issue is whether not disclosing the 
staff study more quickly is a serious procedural error 
requiring a remand to the agency. This issue was never finally 
decided by the CADC, and the Court may wish to remand to CADC 
for a determination. Generally, information relied on by an 
agency should be exposed to comment before decision, although 
this Court has never explicitly approved this principle. One 
suspects that returning this matter to the agency to receive 
comments on the study would be a waste of time. The Court could 
either hold that the information upon which the study was based 
was in the public domain already, or that sufficient other 
information supports the Commission's policy choice. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Peter Byrne 
DATE: November 4, 1980 
RE: No. 79-824, FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild 
At your request, I have attempted to get a clearer 
understanding of what attention" the F.C.C. gives to 
programming content in comparative hearings on initial 
applications for licenses. This ingur iy was prompted by resp 
Listener's Guild's contention that the FCC has drawn a 
distinction between license renewals and assignements, where it 
refuses to examine the content of the broadcaster's programs, 
and initial licensing, where programming is examined to 
determine if it will be in the public unterest and add to 
diversity. My conclusion~~ that resp has overstated the degree / 
of FCC scrutiny into programming at the initial license phase. 
Program content is one, and indeed a minor, factor in 
comparative hearings to determine which applicant should be 
assigned a license; such factors as technical expertise, 
diversity of ownership, and financial stability seem more 
important. See Flint Family Radio, 69 F.C.C.2d 38 (1977). As 
stated at or.al arguement, the nature of the Commission's 
programming inquiry at the initial phase is quantitative, 
rather than quali tiati ve. There are categories of programs, 
including relgious, education, public affairs, local 
programming, news, sports, and entertainment. The Commission 
will look to see whether the applicant's program proposal 
contains a mix of the various programs, and if one category is 
2. 
predominant may inquire into whether emphasis on the one 
program type is in the public interest and fulfills a need in 
the community. See id.; En Bane Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 
2303 (1960); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 
Harv. L. Rev. 701 (1964). However, the Commission remains 
indifferent to the kind of entertainment programming the 
applicant proposes to air. Programming Inquiry at 2308-09. 
Thus, whether to broadcast rock or classical (or even big band 
music) is left to the discretion of the licensee and the 
operation of the market. Moreover, the examination of non-
entertainment programming is limited to categorization and the 
Commission abstains from further evaluation of quality. 
Resp 1 s legal argument must be that the Commission 1 s 
refusal to examine content in the present case is arbitrary, 
since it examines program content with success in granting 
initial applications. This argument can be rejected because of 
I 
the limited examination of content in the i 1 tial license phase. 
The FCC is considering whether to elimiate even the limited 
non-entertainment program inquiry and leave airing of public 
affairs to the discretion of the broadcaster and the dictatles 
of the market. Deragulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979). 
In summary, I continue to believe that the Commission 
has properly exercised its discretion in applying the "public 
interest" standard of the Act by deciding not to regulate 
abandonment of unique formats. 
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JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Sections 309 (a) and 310 (d) of the Communications Act of 
1934, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (Act), empower the Federal 
Communications Commission to grant an application for 
license transfer 1 or renewal only if it ddermines that "the 
public interest, convenience and necessity" will be served 
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thereby.2 The issue before us is whether the Commission, 
when it rules on applications for renewals and ~rs of 
radio broadcast licenses, n;~st review _ _Qast or anticipated 
chan es in a station 's entertainment programming rather than 
relying on market forces to achieve ivers1ty and thus serve 
the public interest. 
2 47 U. S. C. § 309 (a) provides: 
"(a) Subject. to tlw provi;-1ons- of t.hi" ~rlion, ihl' Commission shall 
determine in the cal'i(l of each applicntion filed with it to whirh i<ert.ion il08 
of this title appliPs, whet her the publir intPrPst, convenit'nc£', and nec<'S;:;ity 
wiii be servPd by the grnntmg of isuch applicn1ion, and, if thP Commission, 
upon examination of ~uch application nnrlupon ronf:idemtion of f'uch other 
matters as thE' Commi~·,don mny offic1ally not ic<>, :-:hall find that. public in-
terest, convenience, and ncces~ity would br ~ervt'd thereby, it. shall grant 
$Uch application." 
47 U. S. C. § 310 (d) provides in pnrt : 
"(d) No constructiou p<>rmit or Riation license, or any rigl1ts theretmder 
shall be transferred, assignt'd, or disposed of in any manner, volunta.rily or 
involuntarily, dire('ily or indirectly, or by trnn1-1fer of control of any cor-
poration. holding such prrmit or licenHe, to nny person excPpt upon appli-
cation to the Commission and upon findmg by the Commission tha.t the 
public intereRt, convPnieme, and nere~:>~ity will he HPrved therPby." 
The AcL reqnirPs licensee~ to apply for licen.se renewal every three years. 
47 U. S. C. § 307 (d) . It providC's that. the Commis~>ion shnll grant the 
application for t'enewal if it dPtNmill('S that the public intf'r~t., conven-
ience and neceStiity wmbe served thereby. 47 US. C . §§307 (a.), (d), 
309 (a), (d) . 
Section 309 (d) (1) or tiH' Act providt•s that nny party in intC're:;t ma.y 
petition the Commis~>ion to deny an apph('at ion for licen::;e transfer or 
renewal, but the petition mu::;t contain specifi(' allegations of fact sufficient 
to show that granting t1w UJlplication would be "prima. facie incon::.istent" 
with the publie interest. 47 U S. C'. § 30!:1 (d) (1) . If the Commi::!i:iion 
determines on the basi::; or the application, tlw pleadings filed, or other 
IniLtter ' which it may officiall) notiee t1utt no ;.;ubstantial and material 
question.s of fact are present!'d , it may grunt thE' apJ)Iication and deny the 
petit.ion without conductmg a hearing. 47 U. S. C . § 309 (d) (2). How-
ever, if a sub~:~tantial and matPrial que:-'11011 or faet 1s presentt>d or if the 
Commi~~ion is uuabl(' to dekrmme that granting tht> application would be 
consistent with the puhhc intere~:~t, tlw ConunJ::;:-;ion must conduct a llCHt-
ing <>n tl1e apt)Iica.tion. 47 U . S. C § 309 (d) (2). 
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This issue arose when, pursuant to its informal rulemaking 
authority, the Commission issued a "Policy Statement" con-
cluding that the public intereEt 1s best served by promoting 
diversity in entertainment formats through market forces and 
competition among broadcasters and that a change in enter-
tainment programming is therefore not a material factor that 
should be considered by the Commission in ruling on an 
application for license renewal or transfer. Respondents, a 
number of citizen groups interested in fostering and preserving 
particular entertainment formats, petitioned for review in the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. That court 
held that the Commission's Policy Statement violated the 
Act. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
1I 
Beginning in 1970, in a series of cases involving license 
transfers,3 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia· 
Circuit gradually developed a set of criteria for determining 
when the "public-interest" standard requires the Comm'ission 
to hold a hearing to review proposed changes in entertainment 
formats. 4 Noting that the aim of the Act is "to secure the 
maximum benefits of raaio to all the people of the United 
States," National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 
190, 217 (1943), the Court of Appeals ruled in 1974 that 
3 Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, - U. S. App. D. C. 
-, 506 F. 2d 246 (1974) (en ·banc); Citizens Committee to Keep Pro-
gressive Rock v. FCC,- tJ. S. App. D. C. -, 478 F. 2d 926 (1!:!73); 
Lakewood Broadcru;ting Service, Inc. v. PCC, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 
478 F. 2d 919 (1973); Hartfm·d Communications Comm·it"tee v. FCC, -
U . S. App. D . C. -, 467 F. 2d 408 (1972); Citizens Committee to Pre-
serve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta v. FCC,- U.S. App. D. C. -, 
436 F. 2d 2-!k~ (1970). 
4 We shall refer to the Court of Appeab' views on when the Commission 
must review changes in !:'ntert<tinment format a~ the "forma.t doctrine," · 
and we shall often refer to a change in entertainment programming by .a 
r~clio broudc_aster as a change in forma.t . . 
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''preservation of a format [that] would otherwise disappear; 
although economically and technologically viable and preJ 
ferred by a s;gnificant number of listeners, is generally in the 
public interest." Citizens Committee to Save WEF'M v. FCC, 
-U.S. App. D. C.-,--, 506 F. 2d 246, 268 (1974) (en 
bane). It concluded that a change in format would not pre-
sent "substantial and material questions of fact" requiring a 
hearing if ( 1) notice of the change had not precipitated "sig-
nificant public grumbling"; (2) the segment of the popula: 
tion preferring the format was too small to be accommodated 
by available frequencies; (3) there was an adequate substitute 
in the service area for the format being abandoned; " or 
( 4) the format would be economically unfeasible even · if the 
station were managed efficiently.6 The court rejected the 
Commission's position that the choice of entertainment for-
mats should be left to the judgment of the licensee/ stating 
5 In Citizens Committee to Save WEF M v. FCC, s·upra, for example, the 
court directed the Commission to consider whether a "fine arts" format 
was a reasonable substitute for a classical music format. - U. S. App. 
D. C., at -, 506 F . 2d, at 264-265. The court obt,;erved that 19th-cen-
tury classical music and 20th-century cla.;;sical music could be classified 
as different formats, :since "the lo;;s of either would unquestionably lessen 
diversity." -U.S. App. D. C., at -, 11. 28, 506 F. 2d, at 265, n. 28. 
6 These criteria were summarized by the Court of Appeals in the opinion 
below. WNCN Listene1's Guild v. FCC,- lT. S. App. D. C.,-,-, 
610 F . 2d 838, 842-843 ( 1979) (footnotes omitted). It was abo stated 
that the format doctrine logically applie; to renewal ag we1l as transfer 
applications. 'll:te court noted that a mid-tenn format change would not 
. be con:sidered until the broadcaster applied for license renewal. - U. S. 
App. D. C., at -, and n. 30, 610 F.'2d, at 849, ·and n. 30. See also 
Citizens Committee tv P1'eserve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta v. FCC, 
supm, - U. S. App. D . C., at -, 436 F . 2d, at 272. 
7 See Citizens Committee to P1'eserve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta v: 
FCC, sup1'a, - U. S. App. D. C., at -, 436 F . 2d, 1~t 267. See also' 
W NCN Listene1·s Guild v. FCC, s·upra, - U. S. App. D. C., at -, n. 3i; · 
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that the Commission's interpretation of the public-interest 
standard was arbitrary and unreasonable.8 
In January 1976 the Commission responded to these de-
cisions by undertaking an inquiry into its role in reviewing· 
format changes.u In particular, the Commission sought public 
comment on whether the public interest would be better· 
served by Commission scrutmy of entertainment program-
ming or by reliance on the competitive marketplace.10 
Following public notice and comment, the Commission 
issued a Policy Statement 11 pursuant to its rulemaking au-
thority under the Act. 1~ The Commission concluded in the 
Policy Statement that review of format changes was not 
compelled by the language or history of the Act, would not 
advance the welfare of the radio-listening public, would pose 
substantial administrative problems, and would deter innova-
tion in radio programming. In support of its position, the 
Commission quoted from FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio 
Station, 309 U. S. 470, 475 (1940) : "Congress intended to 
8 C-itizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, supra, -
U. S. App. D. C., at -, n. 25, 47S F . 2d, at 934, n. 25. Although the 
i&>ue before the court was whether <L he-dring was required, the court 
warned the Commission that its pubhc-iuterest determination would also 
be subject to judicial review : 
"[F]ailure to render a reasoned decision will be, a~> always, reversible error. 
No more is required, no less is accepted." - U. S. App. D. C., at-, 
478 F. 2d, at 934 {footnote omitted) . 
9 Notice of Inquiry, Development of Policy re : Changes in the Enter~ 
tainment Formats of Broadcast .Stations, 57 F. C. C 2d 580 (1976). 
10 The Commil:iSion allio invited intere;ted parties to consider the impact 
of the format doctrine on First Amendment value:>. 
11 Memomndum Opinion a?U.l Order, 60 F. C. C. 2d 858 (1976) ("Policy 
Statement"), reconsideration uenied, 66 F . C. C. 2d 78 ( 1977). 
1 ~ Section 303 (r) of the Act, 47 U S. C § 30:3 (r), provides that "the 
Commi:ssion from time to tim!:', as pnbhc convemence, intere;t, or necessity 
requires, :shall . . . Lm]ake such rules a.nd regulations and prCl:icribe such 
restrictions and conditiOns, not inromnstent w1ih law, as may be necessar.r 
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leave competition in the business of broadcasting where it 
found it, to permit the licensee ... to survive or succumb 
according to his ability to make his programs attractive to 
the public." ta The Commission also emphasized that a broad-
caster is not a common carrier 14 and therefore should not be 
subjected to a burden similar to the common carrier's obliga-
tion to continue to provide service if abandonment of that 
service would conflict with public convenience or necessity.1 n 
13 The Commission observl'd that radw broadcab'ters mLturally compete 
in the area of program format:;, since there is virtually no other form of 
competition available. A :;talf study of program diversity in major mar-
kets supported the Commis:;ion's view that competition is effective in pro-
motir>g diversity in entertainment formats. Policy Statement, :Jupra, 60 
F. C. C. 2d, at 861. 
The Notice of Inquiry also explained the Commis:;ion's reasons for rely-
irg on competition to provide diver:se entertainment formats: 
"Our traditional view has been that the station's entertainment format 
is a matter best left. to the discretion of the lic(:>nsee or applicant, since he 
will tend to program to meet certain preferencel> of the area and fill signifi-
cant voids which are left by the Jlrogrnmming of other stations. The 
Commission's accumulated experience indicate:; that . . . [f) requent.ly, 
when a station changes its format, other :stations in the area adjust or 
change their format:; in an effort to :secure the listenership of t.he discon-
tinued format." Nottce of Inquiry, supra, 57 F. C. C. 2d, at 583. 
14 Section 3 (h) of the Act provides that "a person engaged in radio 
broadcasting shall not .. . be deemed a common carrier." 47 U. S. C. 
§ 153 (h) . See also, FCC v. Samlers Brother:J Radio Station, 309 U. S. 
470, 474 (1940) ("[B ]roadca::;ters are not common carriers and are not to 
be dealt with a;; such. Thus the l Communi~Ltions] Act recognizes that 
the field of broadca;;ting is one of free competition." ) 
15 The Commis:;ion di:scussed the problem:; ari:;ing from "the obligation 
to continue service" created by the Court of Appe<a!l:l' fom1at doctrine. 
The Commission apparently used this phrase to describe those cases in 
which it thought the Court of Appeab would hold that. an application for 
license transfer or renewal :should have been denied becau;;e the aban-
donment of a unique entertainment format was inconsistent with the pub-
lic interest. Although the format cases only addres:sed whether a hearing 
was required, the Comt of Appealb Implied that in some situations the 
Commi:>sion would b(~ required to dE'n an applica.tion b E>cause of a ct-Iange 
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The Commission also concluded that practical considera-
tions as well as statutory interpretation supported its reluct-
ance to regulate changes in formats. Such regulation would 
require the Commission to categorize the formats of a sta-
tion 's prior and subsequent programming to determine whether 
a change in format had occurred; to determine whether the 
prior format was "unique"; w and to weigh the public detri-
ment resulting from the abandonment of a unique format 
agaiust the public benefit resulting from that change. The 
Commission emphasized the difficulty of objectively evaluat-
ing the strength of listener preferences, of comparing the de-
sire for diversity within a particular type of programming to 
the desire for a broader range of program formats and of 
assessing the finaucial feasibility of a unique format. 17 
Finally, the Commission explained why it believed that 
lnarket forces were the best available means of producing 
diversity in entettailllnent formats. First, in large markets, 
competition among broadcasters had aiready produced "an 
almost bewildering array of diversity" in entertainment for-
in entertainment fortnat . See Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive 
Rock v. FCC, supra, - U. S. App. b. C., a.t -, 478 F. 2d, at 934. 
The Commission also addre;;srd the ''constitutiona.l dimersion" of the 
format doctrine . It conciudrd thai the doctrine would be likely to deter 
many licensees from experimenting with new fom1s of entertainment pro-
gramming, since the iicensee could be burdened with t.he expense of par-
ticipating in a hearing before the Commission if for some reas:m it wished 
to abandon the experimentai format. Thu:;, 
"[tlhe existence of the obligation to continue service . .. inevitably de-
prives the public at the best efforts of the broadcasting industry and re-
sults in an inhibition of constitutionally protected forms of communication 
with no offs:•tting justificatwns, either in terms of sprcific First Amendment 
or diver;:ity-related values or in broader public interest terms." 
10 In the Notice of Inquiry, the Commil:lsion discuss:>d the difficult task 
of eatrgorizirg formats. notirg that the Court of Appeals bad suggested in 
1he WEFM ca:;e that 19th-<'entury classi~al mu:;ic :;hould be distinguished 
from 20th-rentury classiral music . Notice of Inquiry, supra, 57 F. C. C. 
2d. at 583, and n. 2. 
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mats.18 Second, format allocation by market forces accom-
modates listeners' desires for diversity within a given format 
and also produces a variety of formats. 19 Third, the market 
is far more flexible than governmental regulation and responds 
more quickly to changing public tastes. Therefore, the Com-
mission concluded that "the market is the allocation m~cha­
nism of preference for entertainment formats, and ... Com-
mission supervision in this area will ·not be conducive either 
to producing program diversity [or] satisfied radio listeners." 20 
The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, held "that the Com-
miss;on's policy was contrary to the Act as const-rued and · 
applied in the court's prior format decisions. WNCN Lis-
teners Guild v. FCC~- U.S~ App. D: C~ -, 610 F. 2d 838 
(1979). The court queEtioned ·whether the Commission had 
rationally and impartially re-examined its position 21 and par-
ticularly criticized the Commission's failure to disclose a staff · 
study on the effectiveness of market allocation of formats be-
fore it issued the P"olicy Statement.22 The court then 
18 !d., at 863. 
19 The Commi::;sion pointed out that a significant. segment of the public 
may ~trongly prefer one ~tation to another even if both stations pla.y the 
same type of music. Although it would be diffiCult for the Commis::;icn to 
compare the strength of intra-fonnat preference~ to the ::,-trength of inter-
format preferences, mar:Ket forces would"naturally respond·to intra-format 
preferences, albPit in an imperfect manner. Policy Statement, supm, 60 
F. C. C. 2d, at Sff4. 
20 Policy Statement, supra, 60 F: C. C. Zd; at 866; n. 8. 
21 The court was of the view that the C--mmission 's "Notice of Inquiry" 
revealed a substantial bias against the WEPM de~ision, and that the Com-
mission had overstated the admmistrative problems created by the format 
doctrine. 
22 The study was releasrd prior to the Ccmm'::;~:;ion's dPnial of recon-
sideration of its Policy Statement The court questioned whether the 
public had had an adequate opportunity to comment on the study but 
found it unnecessary to consider whetlwr the Policy Statement ~:;hould be 
set asid? on that ground : 
"Petitioners u~ge this defect as an independent ground for overturning 
tbe- Gommi~sion. We agree that the study does raise serious questions 
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responded to the Commission's criticisms of the format doc~ 
trine. First, although conceding that market forces gen-
erally lead to diversification of formats, it concluded that the 
market only imperfectly reflects listener preferences 23 and 
that the Commission is statutorily obligated to review format 
changes whenever there is "strong prima facie evidence that 
the market has in fact broken down." - U. S. App. D. C., 
at -, 610 F. 2d, at 851. Second, the court stat::d that the 
administrafve problems pm:ed by the format doctrine were 
not insurmountable. Hearings would only be required in a 
small number of cases, and the Commission could cope with 
problems such as classifying radio formats by adopting "ra-
tional classification schema." - U. S. App. D. C., at -, 
610 F. 2d, at 853. Third, the court observed that the Com-
mission had not demonstrated that the format doctr:ne would 
deter innovative programming.24 Finally, the court explained 
that it had not directed the Commission to engage in censor-
ship or to impose common carrier obrgations on licensees: 
about the overall rationality and faimel:ls of the Commission's decision. 
However, becaul:le certain broader defects, of which the study is symp-
tomatic, are fatal to the Commission's <~ctions, we need not decide whether 
the failure to obtain public comment on the study is itself of suffi~ient 
gravity to w<~rrant re.iection of the Policy Statement ." - U. S. App. 
D. C., at-, n. 24, 610 F. 2d, at 847, n. 24. 
Respondents urge the Court to s::>t aside the Policy Statement because 
of this alleged procedural error if the Court determines that the Commis-
sion's views do not conflict with the Act or the First Amendment. We 
have considered the submissions of the parties and do not consider the 
action of the Commission, even if a procedural lapse, to be a suffici:ont 
ground for reopening the proceedirgs before the Commission. 
23 The court obl:lerved, as it had in WEFM, that becaul:le broadcasters 
rely on advertising revenue they tend to serve persons with large dis·re-
tionary incomes. - U. S. App. D. C., at-, 610 F . 2d, at 851. The 
dis:senting 0pinion noted that the C01rmission had not rejected this assump. 
tion . - U. S. App. D . C., at -, 610 F. 2d, at 851. 
24 The court stated that the Commi~sion's staff study demonstrated that 
licenseees had continued to develop :diverse ent~rtainment formats after 
, the . WEFM deril!k>IJ. . 
•' 
10 
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WEFM did not authorize the Commission to interfere with 
licensee programming choices or to force retention of an exist-
ing format; it merely stated that the Commission had the 
power to consider a station's format in deciding whether 
license renewal or transfer would be consistent with the public 
interest. - U. S. App. D. C., at -, 610 F. 2d, at 851-852. 
Although conceding that it possessed neither the expertise 
nor the authority to make policy decisions in this area, the 
Court of Appeals asserted that the format doctrine was "law," 
not "policy," 25 and was of the view that the Commission had 
not disproved the factual assumptions underlying the format 
doctrine.26 Accordingly, the court declared that the Policy 
Statement was "unavailing and of no force and effect." 
- U. S. App. D. C., at -, 610 F. 2d, at 858.27 
II 
Rejecting the Commission's reliance on market forces to 
develop diversity in programming as an arbitrary and unrea-
sonable interpretation of the Act's mterest standard, the Court 
of Appeals held that in certain cif'cumstances the Commission 
25 The court acknowledged that Congress had entrusted to the Commis-
sion the task of ensuring that license grants are used in the public interest. 
Nevertheless, the Commission's position on review of entertainment format 
changes "could not be sustained even when all ·due deference was given 
that construction." - U. S. App. D . C., at-, n. 51, 610 F. 2d, at 855, 
n. 51. wt~ n~+ 
26 The Court of Appeals ..., 6'dltt 'be saJiRfied that. the market. functioned 
adequately in every case; nor was it penn.1aded that the loss of a unique 
format is comparable to the loss of a favorite station within a particular 
format. 
27 Two judges dissented, argu]ng that the Policy Statement should have 
been upheld, since the Commission had made a reasonable judgment thl~t 
the format doctrine was unnecessary to further the public interest. A 
third judge agreed with the dissenters tha.t the majority had not accorded 
sufficient defer~nce to the Commis~ion's judgment, but concluded that the 
Commission's order should be vacated so that the record could be r~ 
. opened to pennit j)Ub!ic comment on the &1aff study. 
79-824, 79-825, 79-826, & 79--827-0PINION 
FCC v. WNCN LISTENERS GUILD 11 
is required to regard a change in entertainment format as a 
substantial and material fact in deciding whether a license 
renewal or transfer is in the public interest. With all due 
respect, however, we are unconvinced that the Court of 
Appeals' format doctrine is compelled by the Act and that 
the Commission's interpretation of the public interest stand-
ard must therefore be set aside. 
It is common ground that the Act does not define the term 
"public interest, convenience, and necessity." ·28 The Court 
has characterized the public-interest standard of the Act as 
"a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the 
expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legis-
lative policy." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 
134, 138 (1940). Although it was declared in National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, supra, that the goal of the Act is 
"to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people 
of the United States," 319 U. S., at 217, it was also emphasized 
that Congress had granted the Commission broad discretion 
in determining how that goal could best be achieved. The 
Court accordingly declined to substitute its own views on the 
best method of encouraging effective use of the radio for the 
views of the Commission. 319 U. S., at 218. Similiarly, in 
FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 
U. S. 775 (1978) , we deemed the policy of promoting the 
widest possible dissemination from diverse sources to be con-
sistent with both the public-interest standard and the First 
Amendment, 436 U. S., at 775, but emphasized the Commis-
sion's broad power to regulate in the public interest. We 
noted that the Act permits the Commission to promulgate 
t'such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, as may 
be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act," 29 and 
28 The Acl. provides in grneral termt~ ihat ihl' Commission shall perform 
administrative functions "as public conwnience, interest, or necessity re-
~uires." 47 U. S. C. § 303. 
20 See 47 U. S. C. § 303: (r), quoted at n. 12, supra .. 
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that this general' rulemaking authority permits the Commis~ 
sion to implement its view of the public-interest standard of 
the Act "so long as that view is based on consideration of 
permissible factors and- is otherwise reasonable." !d., at 
793.3° Furthermore, we recognize that the Commission's de-
cisions must sometimes rest on judgment and prediction rather 
than pure factual determinations. Ii1 such cases complete 
factual support for the Commission's ultimate conclusions is 
not required, since" 'a forecast of the direction in which future 
public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on 
the expert knowledge of the agency.'" 81 
The Commission has provided a rational explanation for· I 
its conclusion that reliance on the market is the best method 
of promoting diversity in entertainment formats. The Court 
of Appeals and the Commission agree that in the vast ma-
jority of cases market forces provide sufficient diversity. The 
Court of Appeals favors government intervention when there 
is evidence that market forces have deprived the public of a 
"unique" format, while the Commission is content to rely on 
the market, pointing out that in many cases when a station 
changes its format, other stations will change their formats 
30 Section 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides in part: 
"The reviewing court shall-
"(2) hold unlawful and set al:iide agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be-
"(a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of di~cretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law .. .. '' 5 U. S. C. § 706 (Z) (A). 
ln FCC v. National Citizenl! Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 775 
(1978), we observed that a reviewing court applying this standard "'is not 
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.'" 436 U. S., 
at 803, quoting Citizens to PreservP Overton Par-k v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
416 (1971) . 
31 FCC v. National Citizens Committee jo1· Br-oadcasting, supra, 43($ 
U. S., at 814, quoting FPC v. Transcontmental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 
:u. 8.1.,:29 (1961). ' 
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to attract listeners who preferred the discontinued format.sz 
The Court of Appeals places great value on preserving di-
versity among formats, while the Commission emphasizes the 
value of intra-format as well as inter-format diversity. Fin-
ally, the Court of Appeals is convinced that review of format 
changes would result in a broader range of formats, while the 
Commission believes that government intervention is likely to 
deter innovative programming. 
In making these judgments, the Commission has not for-
saken its obligation to pursue the public interest. On the 
contrary, it has assessed the benefits and the harm likely to 
flow from government review of entertainment programming, 
and on balance has concluded that its statutory duties are 
best fulfilled by not attempting to oversee format changes. 
This decision was in major part based on predictions as to 
the probable conduct of licensees and the functioning of the 
broadcasting market and on the Commission's assessment of 
its capacity to make the determinations required by the format 
doctrine. These predictions are within the institutional com-
petence of the Commission. The Commission's implementa-
tion of the public interest standard, when based on a rational 
weighing of competing policies, is not to be set aside by the 
Court of Appeals, for "the weighing of policies under the 
'public interest' standard is a task that Congress has delegated 
to the Commission in the first instance." FCC v. National 
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, supra, 436 U. S., at 
810.88 The Commission's position on review of format 
82 The Commission recognizes that it will never be possible to achieve 
a perfect correlation between listener preferences and available program-
ming. The Court of Appeab does not contend that a perfect correlation 
can ever be achieved, but it insists that the Commission must actively seek 
to accommodate the "first preference" of any "significant segment" of the 
listening public. 
88 The Court has repeatedly :;tated that the Commis,;ion's judgmE-nt re-
garding how the public interest is best served is entitled to substantial 
judicial deference. See, e. g., FCC v. National Citizens Committee fo'F 
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changes reflects a reasonable accommodation of the policy of 
promoting diversity in programming and the policy of avoid-
ing unnecessary restrictions on licensee discretion. As we see 
it, the. Commission's Policy Statement is in harmony with 
cases recogni:dng that the Communications Act seeks to pre-
serve journalistic discretion while prom.otiug the interests of 
the listening public.a4 
The Policy Statement is ~lso consistent with the legisl~ve 
histocyOf the Acf. Although Cougress did not consider the 
p~re us, it did consider and reject a proposal to 
allocate a certain percentage of the stations to particular 
types of programming.3 " Similiarly, one of the bills submitted 
prior to passage of the Radio Act of 1927.30 included a pro-
vision requiring stations to comply with programming priori-
ties based on subject matter.37 This provision was event-
ually deleted since it was considered to border on censorship.38 
Congress eventually added a section to the Radio Act of 1927 
expressly prohibiting censorship and other "interfer[ence] 
B1·oadcasting, supra,· FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U. S. 223, 229 (1946); 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943). 
34 See, e. g., FCC v. Muhcest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 705 (1979) 
(recognizing the "policy of the Act to preserve editorial control of pro-
gramming in the licensee"); Columbta Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 120 (discul:ll:ling the Commission's 
duty to cha1t a workable "middle course" to preserve "essentially private 
broadcast jouJlflism held only broadly accountttblc to public interest 
standards") . 
85 Congress reject('d a proposal to allocate 25% of all radio sta1ions 
to educational, religiouti, agriwltural, and simihLr nonprofit associ<Ltions. 
See 78 Cong. ltec . 884:3-8846 (1934). 
86 44 Stat. 116!. The Radio Act of 1927 was tl1e predecessor to the 
Communications Act. 
81 This bill would have required the administrative agl:'ncy created by 
the Radio Act of 1927 to prescribe "priorities as to subject. ma.tter to be 
ob:;erved by each class of lieensed :;laLious." H. R.. 7357, 68th Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 1 (B) (l924) . 
18 Hearing:; on H. R. 5589 be.forl:' the House Committee on the Merchant 
Marine & Fisheries, 69th Coull)., 1st SrS'>., :89 (1926). 
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with the right of free speech by means of radio communica-
tion." :Jo That section was retained in the Communications 
Act.4 \) As we read the legislative history of the Act. CongTeSSl 
did not unequivocally express its disfavor of entertainment 
format review by the Commissi.Q.l4-but neither is there sub-
stantial indication that Congress expected the public interest 
standard to require format regulation by the Commissio!l· 1 
The legislative history of the Act does not support the Court 
of Appeals and provides insufficient basis for invalidating 
the agency's construction of the Act. 
In the past we have stated that "the construction of a 
.statute by those charged with its execution should be fol-
·lowed unless there are compelling indications that it is 
wrong .... " 41 Prior to 1979, the Commission consistently 
stated that the choice of programming formats should be left 
to the licensee.42 In 1971 the Commission restated that posi-
tion but announced that any applic'ation for license transfer 
or renewal involving a substantial change in program format 
ao Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1754 bPfore the Senate Committee on Inter-
state Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 (1926). H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 
1886, 69th Cong., 2d s~s., 16-19 (19·27). 
' 0 Section 326 of the Act providPs: 
"Nothing in this chapter ::;haJJ be uuden;tood or con::;trued to give the 
Commission the power of cen;;orship over the radio communications or 
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or eondition 
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Conuni::;;;ion which shall interfere 
with the right of free speech by meum; of radio communication." 47 
U.S. C.§ 326. 
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978), the Court con-
cluded that althought this section prohibits the Commis;;ion from editing 
proposed broadcast:; in advance, it does not preclude ;;ubsequent review of 
program content. 438 U. S., at 735. 737. 
' 1 Red Lion Broad('asting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969). See 
also Columbia Broadca;;ti1l(f S!!stem, Inc. v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, 412 U. S. 94, 121 (1973) . 
42 See, e. g., Progmrnmino Policy Statement. 44 F. C. C 2303, 2308-2309 
(1960): B(t!/ RQ-dio, Inc., ;22 F. C. C. 1351,1351,1364 (1957). 
:J 
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would have to be reviewed in light of the Court of Appeals' 
decision in Citizens Committee to Preserve the Voice of the 
Arts in Atlanta, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 436 F. 2d 267 
(1970), in which the Court of Appeals first articulated the 
format doctrine.48 In 1973, in a statement accompanying 
the grant of the transfer application that was later challenged 
in WEFM, a majority of the Commissioners joined in a com-
mitment to "take an extra hard look at the reasonableness of 
and proposal which would deprive a community of its only 
source of a particular type of programming." 44 However, the 
48 Prime·r on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Ap-
plicants. 27 F. C. C. 2d 650, 679-680 (1971). 
The Commission explained: 
"Our view has been that the station'l:l program fonnat il:l a matter bel:lt 
left to the discretion of the licensee or applicant, ;:;ince as a matter of public· 
acceptance and economic necessity he will tend to program to meet the 
preferences of the area and fill whatever void is left by the programming· 
of other stations." 27 F. C. C. 2d, at 679. 
The Commission noted that this policy only applied to entertainment 
programming. "It does not include matters such as an increase in com-
mercial matter or decrease in the amount of non-entertainment program-
ming, both of which are subjects of review and concern, and have been for 
some time." !d., at n. 15. 
The Commission continues to review nonentertainment programming-
to some degree. It has provided a rational explanation for distinguishing· 
between entertainment and non entertainment programming: 
"To the extent that the Commission exercises some direct control of pro-
gramming, it is primarily through the fairness doctrine and political bread-
casting rules pursuant to Section 315.. ln both cases the Commission's role· 
Is limited to directing the licensee to broadcast some additional material so 
as not to completely ignore the viewpoints of others in the community .... 
These rPgulations are extremely narrow, the Commission's role is limited 
by strictly defined standards, and the licensee is left with virtually unre-
stricted discretion in programmir>g most of the broadcast day. In con-
trast, [under the format doctrine] we would be faced with the prospect ot 
rejecting virtually the entire broBd"a;:;t schedule proposed by the prviate 
licensee . .. . " 66 F. C. C. 2d 78, 83 (denying reconsideration of the 
Poliry Statement) . 
44 Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F . C. C. 2d 223, 230 (1973) (Additional ViewS' 
'II!Jf 1Chairrt:ran Burch). 
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Commission's later Policy Statement concluded that this ap,. 
proach was "neither administratively tenable nor necessary in 
the public interest." 1 5 It is thus apparent that although the 
Commission was obliged to modify its policies to conform to 
the Court of Appeals' format doctrine, the Policy Statement 
reasserted the Commission's traditional preference for achiev-
ing diversity in entertainment programming through market 
forces. 
Respondents contend that the Court of Appeal's judgment 
should be affirmed because, even if not violative of the Act, 
the Policy Statement conflicts with the First Amendment 
rights of listeners "to receive suitable access to social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experience." Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. V'. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969). Red 
Lion held that the Commission's "fairness doctrine" was con-
sistent with the public-interest standard of the Communica-
tions Act and did not violate the First Amendment, but rather 
enhanced First Amendment values by. promoting "the pres-
entation of vigorous debate of controvers;al issues of import-
ance and concern to the pub1ic." 395 U. S., at 385. Al-
though observing that the interests of the people as a whole 
were promoted by debate of public issues on the radio, we 
did not imply that the First Amendment grants individual 
listeners the right to have the Commission review the aban-
donment of their favorite entertainment programs. The 
Commission ~~eks to further interests of the listening public 
as a whole by relying on market forces t.o promote diversity 
'in radio entertainment formats and to satisfy the entertain-
ment preferences of radio listeners.46 This policy does not 
conflict with the First Amendment.47 
u 
45.'PP,licy Staterr1ent, sup·ra, 60 ,F. C. C. 2d, at 8~6, n. 8. 
46 Respondent!S jplace particular emphasis on the role of foreign language-
'programming in ,providing information to non-Engli~h speaking citizens. 
'However, the EP,Iicy Statement only applies to entertainment program-
:Uing. It does Jot address the broadcaster's obligation to respond ~ 
[Footnote 47 is on p. 18] 
·. 
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Contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, th., 
Commission's Policy Statement is not inconsistent with the 
Act. It is also a constitutionally permissible means of im-
plementing the public-interest standard of the Act. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeais is reversed and 
the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion; 
community needs in the area of informational programming. See Tr. of 
Oral Arg ., at 81 (remarks of counsel for the Commission). 
n Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, 412 U. S. 94 (1973), (the First Amendment does not require the 
Commission to adopt a "fairness doctrine" with respect to paid editorial 
~d.vertisem.ents), 
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interest standard contains. 
There is one minor point of questionable accuracy in 
the opinion. At pages 4-5, the opinion states that the CA at 
one time ruled that the Commission's interpretation of the 
public interest standard was arbitrary and unreasonable. The 
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Commission's refusal to hold a hearing in a particular case was 
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Commission's interpretation of the public interest standard is 
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or reasoning of the opinion. 
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